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Combining skin conductance and forced choice in the
detection of concealed information
EWOUT H. MEIJER, FREN T. Y. SMULDERS, JAMES E. JOHNSTON, and
HARALD L.G.J. MERCKELBACH
Department of Experimental Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
Abstract
An advantage of the concealed information polygraph test (CIT) is that its false positive rate is determined on
statistical grounds, and can be set a priori at arbitrary low levels (i.e., few innocents declared guilty). This criterion,
however, inevitably leads to a loss of sensitivity (i.e., more guilty suspects declared innocent). We explored whether the
sensitivity of a CIT procedure could be increased by adding an independent measure that is based on an entirely
different psychological mechanism. In two experiments, we exploredwhether the accuracy of a CITprocedure could be
increased by adding SymptomValidity Testing (SVT), a relatively simple, forced-choice, self-report procedure that has
previously been used to detect malingering in various contexts. Results of a feigned amnesia experiment but not from a
mock crime experiment showed that a combinationmeasure of both tests yielded better detection than either test alone.
Descriptors: Polygraph testing, Guilty Knowledge Test, Concealed Information Test, Symptom Validity Test
The use of the polygraph in criminal investigations has been
heavily criticized in the scientiﬁc literature (e.g., Ben Shakhar,
2002; Fiedler, Schmid, & Stahl, 2002; Lykken, 1998; National
Research Council, 2003). This critique primarily concerns the
Control Question Test (CQT), the technique most widely used in
police investigations. During a CQT, physiological recordings to
questions directly related to the incident under investigation (e.g.,
‘‘Did you stab John Doe?’’) are compared to emotionally pro-
vocative control questions (e.g., ‘‘During the ﬁrst 20 years of
your life, did you ever hurt someone physically?’’). Stronger
physiological responding to the control questions is taken as an
indication of innocence, whereas stronger physiological respond-
ing to the questions directly related to the crime is taken as an
indication of deception. The CQT has been criticized for its lack
of theoretical framework, its lack of standardization, and the fact
that it relies on improper controls, resulting in a high percentage
of false positives (i.e., innocent examinees tested guilty; see Ben-
Shakhar, 2002; Lykken, 1998).
A different interrogation technique, ﬁrst described by
Mu¨nsterberg (1908), and later named the Guilty Knowledge
Test (GKT; Lykken, 1959, 1960) or Concealed Information Test
(CIT) is used less frequently. In fact, the only country where it is
employed on a large scale is Japan (Hira & Furumitsu, 2002;
Nakayama, 2002). In a CIT, physiological measures are similar
to the CQT, but questions are presented in a multiple choice
format (e.g., ‘‘Was the amount ofmoney stolen $10,000, $20,000,
$30,000, $40,000, or $50,000?’’). All questions concern intimate
details of the crime, of which only the investigative authorities
and the perpetrator are presumed knowledgeable. Consistent
stronger physiological responding to the correct answers reﬂects
knowledge of these details and thus involvement in the crime.
Unlike the CQT, the CIT is highly standardized and has a
sound theoretical underpinning in orienting theory, as recently
shown by Verschuere, Crombez, De Clercq, and Koster (2004).
It has also been shown to be a robust tool for discriminating
between guilty and innocent participants. A recent meta-analysis
on 80 studies revealed an average effect size (d ) of 1.55, and this
effect size was even larger (3.12) under optimal conditions (i.e.,
motivational instructions, deceptive verbal response, at least ﬁve
questions; Ben Shakhar & Elaad, 2003). Furthermore, the CIT
provides adequate safeguards for the innocent in that the prob-
ability of a false positive outcome can be determined a priori.
This probability depends on the number of questions, the num-
ber of alternative answers per question, and the criterion for
guilt. For example, when a CITcontains four questions with four
answers each, the probability for an innocent examinee to sys-
tematically show the strongest physiological response to the cor-
rect alternative is (1/4)45 .004. If the criterion for guilt is set at
‘‘respond maximally to at least three out of the four questions,’’
this probability becomes .05.1 Thus, for a CIT, the probability of
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a false positive outcome can be set a priori by including sufﬁcient
questions and alternatives and by selecting a proper detection
criterion. For use in criminal justice, detection criteria that result
in a low number of false positive outcomes (i.e., high speciﬁcity)
are important, because it adheres to the legal doctrine in most
countries, abbreviated in the so-called Blackstone Maxim: ‘‘Bet-
ter that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer’’
(Blackstone, 1882; Volokh, 1997).
However, an inevitable consequence of setting the detection
criteria at levels corresponding with high speciﬁcity is that the
percentage of false negative outcomes (i.e., a guilty examinee
tested innocent) becomes larger. Several recent studies have es-
timated this percentage to range between 14% and 24% (Ben
Shakhar & Elaad, 2003; Elaad, 1998). These studies primarily
relied on mock crime scenarios to determine detection efﬁciency.
The false negative rates in ﬁeld studies on detection efﬁciency of
the CITare even higher. For example, Elaad (1990) and Elaad,
Ginton, and Jungman (1992) found that the CIT missed ap-
proximately half of the guilty suspects, when using skin resistance
response as the detection measure and confessions as an index of
guilt. A more recent mock crime study by Carmel, Dayan,
Naveh, Raveh, and Ben-Shakhar (2003) showed that under re-
alistic conditions, the percentage of false negative outcomes was
as high as 48%. The problem of false negative outcomes asso-
ciated with the CITcannot simply be explained by a perpetrator’s
failure to remember pertinent details. Elaad (1990), for example,
presented the items froma selection of the records to independent
judges. These judges were asked whether these items had at least
an 80% likelihood of being recognized by the guilty subject. This
was the case in the majority of the items, leading Elaad to con-
clude that the high proportion of false negatives was due to the
low number of questions, rather than due to the fact that items
were not encoded inmemory. Likewise, in the study byCarmel et
al. (2003), even though the false negative rate was only 10%
under optimal conditions (i.e., a CIT containing only questions
on central details, performed immediately following a realistic
mock crime), this rate still ranged from 20% to 45% when only
correctly recalled items were analyzed.
One approach to reduce the number of false negatives without
sacriﬁcing speciﬁcity is combining several highly speciﬁc mea-
sures. So far, this approach has primarily focused on the addition
of new psychophysiological indices to the standard measurement
of skin conductance. For example, a speciﬁc respiration param-
eter (respiration line length; RLL) has been shown to increase the
sensitivity (i.e., proportion of correctly classiﬁed guilty exami-
nees) of a skin conductance based CIT (e.g., Ben-Shakhar
& Dolev, 1996; Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2002; Ben Shakhar,
Gronau, & Elaad, 1999; Elaad et al., 1992; Timm, 1982). More
recently,measures such as Finger PulseWaveformLength (Elaad
& Ben-Shakhar, 2006) and Normalized Pulse Volume (Hirota
et al., 2003) have been proposed as useful additional CIT pa-
rameters. In general, the addition of extra physiological variables
is useful if the false negative outcomes of the CITare due to noise
in the measurement of the underlying psychophysiological mech-
anism (i.e., the orienting response). In that case, increasing the
number of physiological indices that are manifestations of this
underlying mechanism will reduce the noise and hence the per-
centage of false negatives.
If the false negative outcomes are not due to measurement
noise, but simply result from the absence of response in the un-
derlying mechanism, adding more psychophysiological indices
might be less fruitful. In this case, simply adding more physio-
logical indices will not increase sensitivity. It might then be more
fruitful to combine the CITwith highly speciﬁc measures that are
independent of the psychophysiological mechanism tapped by
CIT (see also Nies & Sweet, 1994). An interesting candidate
measure that might be used in this way is the Symptom Validity
Test (SVT). This test was developed to detect malingering and
has been used in a wide variety of ﬁelds, including detection of
malingering of perceptual deﬁcits (Brady & Lind, 1961), short-
term memory deﬁcits (Hiscock & Hiscock, 1989), amnesia for
speciﬁc events (Frederick, Carter, & Powel, 1995), and cognitive
deﬁcits attributed to chronic pain (Meyers & Diep, 2000) or
posttraumatic stress disorder (Rosen & Powel, 2003).
The rationale of the SVT lies in the notion that the perfor-
mance of honest individuals (i.e., individuals with genuine per-
ceptual or memory deﬁcits or without intimate knowledge of a
crime) on a forced choice test will be at chance level. Take, for
example, an individual with genuine color blindness. This person
is presented with a series of events, for example red or blue il-
luminating bulbs. After each event, the individual is asked to
name the color of the light bulb that lit up. These questions have a
forced-choice format with answers of equal probability (e.g., 1.
blue, 2. red). For this person, test performance will be at chance
level. An individual with intact perception will perform above
chance level. Deception (i.e., malingering of a perceptual deﬁcits)
is inferred when performance falls signiﬁcantly below chance
level as the person apparently has the ability to systematically
avoid the correct answers and select the incorrect answer more
often than predicted by chance (Denney, 1996). Even when
aware of this rationale, dishonest people may still fail the test due
to humans’ incapacity to generate random series of responses (see
also Haughton, Lewsley, Wilson, & Williams, 1979; Wagenaar,
1972). Because the distribution of the number of correct answers
in individuals with no true ability is known (binomial), the SVT,
like the CIT, allows for the computation of the probability of a
false positive outcome at any chosen detection criteria.
Denney (1996) adapted the SVT for use in a forensic setting
(see also Lieblich & Ninio, 1972; Lieblich, Shaham, & Ninio,
1976). He described three cases where the defendant claimed
amnesia for his or her crime. In all cases, defendants performed
well below chance level at an SVT consisting of questions con-
cerning intimate details of the crime (e.g., ‘‘How did the perpe-
trator leave the bank? 1. walking, 2. running’’). More recent
research on the accuracy of the SVT in detecting feigned amnesia
for mock crimes shows that, at speciﬁcity levels of 95%, its sen-
sitivity ranges from 40% to 60% (Jelicic, Merckelbach, & van
Bergen, 2004a, 2004b; Merckelbach, Hauer, & Rassin, 2002).
Because the SVT measures a different psychological mecha-
nism than the CIT (i.e., limitations of the cognitive system in
producing randomlike responses versus an orienting response),
combining it with a CIT may decrease the number of false neg-
ative outcomes while maintaining high levels of speciﬁcity. The
aim of the current experiments was twofold: First, we explored
whether the SVTcan be used as an indicator of guilt and decep-
tion. Second, we investigated whether the addition of SVT has an
incremental value beyond that of a skin conductance based CIT.
In the ﬁrst experiment, participants performed a mock crime,
mimicking the application of the CIT and SVT in a typical fo-
rensic application. In the second experiment, participants were
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follows: P(A)1P(B) P(A and B), and equals .25414  .253 4 
.2545 .0508.
instructed to feign complete amnesia of their identity, after which
they were given a CIT and SVT containing biographical data.
This test mimics deception in a somewhat different context, for
example, to judge the veracity of amnesia claims or when some-
one’s identity is the topic of investigation.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
Participants were 65 undergraduates who received either course
credits or a small ﬁnancial compensation. Five participants were
excluded from data analyses because they either failed to follow
instructions or equipment malfunctioned. Thus, the remaining
sample consisted of 60 students (20 men) with a mean age of 21
years (SD5 2.8). All participants read and signed a letter of
informed consent before participating. The experiment was ap-
proved by the Faculty’s ethical committee.
Physiological Measures
Skin conductance was measured using a 24-bit DC 0.5-Vsystem.
Two Beckmann Ag/AgCl electrodes (5 mm in diameter) were
placed on the medial phalanges of the ﬁrst and second ﬁngers of
the participants’ nondominant hand. Electrodes were ﬁlled with
isotonic electrode paste (0.9%NaCl). Respiration was measured
using a strain gauge attached around the thorax. All data were
acquired using Contact Precision Instruments bioampliﬁers with
a sample rate of 200 Hz.
Procedure
Upon arrival in the laboratory, the participant was given written
instructions to carry out a scenario. For half of the participants
(N5 30), these instructions entailed the guilty scenario. The
other half received the innocent scenario. The guilty scenario
consisted of stealing 20 euros and a mobile telephone hidden
away in a jacket in a cafe´ located inside the university building.
To gain access to this cafe´, participants had to collect a key, which
was located in a drawer of a kitchen unit. In the innocent con-
dition, the task involved collecting a dirty cup from a kitchen and
washing it elsewhere. Both innocent and guilty instructions were
concluded by telling the participant to wait for further instruc-
tions in a waiting room. After 15 min the examiner entered the
room and informed participants that ‘‘a crime has been com-
mitted and you are one of the suspects. If you are guilty, try to lie
effectively during the lie detection test so that youwill be declared
innocent.’’ Following this, the experimenter escorted the partic-
ipants back to the laboratory where testing commenced.
The CIT consisted of one example question and six genuine
questions. Questions were presented on a 15-in. monitor. Each
question was followed by a set of six items, among which was the
correct answer (critical item). The ﬁrst item was never the critical
item and served to absorb novelty orienting responses. The six
questions of the CIT addressed both central and peripheral de-
tails of the crime. Each question was displayed for 10 s. Then, a
blank screen followed for 3 s, after which the ﬁrst item was dis-
played for 3 s. Next, another blank screen followed for 10 s. This
cycle was repeated for each of the six items, creating a 26-s in-
terstimulus interval. The critical item was always positioned at
either the third, fourth, or ﬁfth place. The order of the questions
was determined by a balanced latin square. Participants had to
respond to the presentation of each item with a verbal ‘‘no’’
answer. A participant-terminated break was given after comple-
tion of an entire question.
Upon completion of the CIT, participantswere given the SVT.
The SVTconsisted of 12 questions, each with two equally plau-
sible alternatives. These items were checked using a Doob and
Kirschenbaum pilot procedure to ensure they were all equally
plausible (Doob & Kirschenbaum, 1973). For this procedure,
10 naı¨ve participants were given all questions and asked to pick
the most plausible item. Any item for which the probability
was below .3 or above .7 was discarded. Six of the 12 SVTques-
tions resembled those of the CIT. The additional six questions
concerned speciﬁc details of the cafe´ where the mock crime
took place. The SVTwas administered in the form of a booklet,
containing only one question per page with the following instruc-
tions: ‘‘Complete this questionnaire by circling one of the answers
to each question. You must always choose one option. If you do
not know the answer, just guess. You must answer the questions
in the order they are presented. Do not turn to the next page
unless the question has been answered. Do not turn back the
page under any circumstance.’’ The thickness of the booklet was
increased by adding 12 empty pages at the end. This was done
so as to obscure the true length of the test, making it difﬁcult
for participants to calibrate their performance in accordance
with chance. To prevent participants from deriving correct
CIT answers from the SVT answers, the CIT was always
administered ﬁrst.
All testing took place in a dimly lit, sound-proof, air-condi-
tioned laboratory. Participants were monitored from a control
roombymeans of a video surveillance camera and amicrophone.
Response Scoring and Data Analysis
The maximal positive deﬂection in skin conductance during the
1 s to 5 s interval after stimulus onset was deﬁned as the SCR. To
eliminate individual differences in responsivity, within-question
standardized scores were computed by subtracting the mean of
all ﬁve responses from the response to the critical item and di-
viding that by the standard deviation of all ﬁve responses (Ben-
Shakhar, 1985). These standardized scores were then averaged
over questions in order to produce a single detection score for
the CIT.
Siegel’s (1956) formula was used to calculate the z-score for
the SVT: z5 ((x  0.5)NP)/p(NP(1P)). Here, z is the test
statistic, x is the number of correct responses, N is the total
number of questions (i.e., 12), and P is the probability of a cor-
rect discrimination given no true ability (i.e., 0.5). Due to the fact
that the binomial distribution involves a discrete variable, a cor-
rection for continuity was made: adding 0.5 when x oNP and
subtracting 0.5 when x4NP.
Results and Discussion
The SVTand CIT scores within guilty participants were uncor-
related (r5  .11; p5 .56). To derive accuracy rates, cutoff
points for the detection measures were set at a z-scoreo 1.65
for the SVT (corresponding to a speciﬁcity of 95%), whereas for
the CIT, the Lykken score was used. With the latter, each ques-
tion is assigned 2 points if the response to the crime relevant item
is the largest of all responses, 1 point is assigned if it is the second
largest, and 0 points are assigned in all other cases. All points
are then added, and a score of 6 or more is taken as a guilty
test outcome. Based on the binomial theorem, this cutoff point
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corresponds to a speciﬁcity of 83% (see also MacLaren, 2001).
To determine accuracy rates for the combination of the CITand
SVT, we used the Independent Parallel Testing approach (Na-
tional Research Council, 2003, p. 367). With this approach, de-
ception is inferred if any of the individual tests is positive.
Consequently, overall test outcome is negative only when all
individual tests are negative.
The cutoff resulted in correct classiﬁcation of all of the
innocent (100%) and 14 (47%) of the guilty participants for
the CIT. For the SVT, it yielded correct classiﬁcation of all
(100%) of the innocent and 8 (27%) of the guilty participants.
The combination of the CIT and SVT resulted in correct
classiﬁcation of all innocent (100%) and 17 (57%) of the guilty
participants.
Deﬁning guilt and innocence using the criteria based method
described above has the disadvantage that it relies on a single,
arbitrary cutoff point. An alternative approach to describing
detection efﬁciency that does not have this disadvantage is signal
detection theory (SDT; National Research Council, 2003). This
method deﬁnes detection efﬁciency in terms of the degree of
separation between the distributions of the detection measure for
the innocent and the guilty conditions. To produce a single
detection score for the combination of the two tests, the
SVT z-score was multiplied by  1 and added to the CIT
z-score. Subsequently, the distance between the centers of the
distribution of the innocent and the distribution of the guilty
was computed in terms of standard deviation (d ), and the area
under the (empirical) Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curve (a) was computed. These statistics are presented in Table 1
(top panel). Table 1 reveals that d values for the CIT and SVT
were 1.62 and 0.79, respectively. The d value for the combination
of CIT and SVT was 1.42. The areas under the ROC
curve were .86 for the CIT, .70 for the SVT, and .84 for the
combination.
These results indicate that the SVTcan be used to detect de-
ception in a typical forensic setting, even though sensitivity was
modest. The signal detection parameters revealed no incremental
validity of the SVTover the CIT. To conceptually replicate these
results, we conducted a second experiment.
In this second experiment, a number of methodological im-
provements and extensions were made. First, to allow for gen-
eralization of the results, a community sample was used, an
incentive for beating the test was given, and a feigned amnesia
paradigm was applied. To increase statistical power, only guilty
participants were included. Furthermore, any possible carryover
effect due to the ﬁxed order in Experiment 1 was addressed by
using different questions for each test and balancing the order of
the tests. Also, the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI;
Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996) was included as a measure of psy-
chopathic traits.
Previous research has shown that psychopathy might be a
moderating factor in detecting concealed information. Hypore-
activity is a prominent feature of psychopathy (Lorber, 2004),
and recently Verschuere, Crombez, Declercq, and Koster (2005)
showed that prisonerswho scored high on certain subscales of the
PPI exhibited both a decreased overall electrodermal orienting
response and decreased differential electrodermal orienting re-
sponses to the relevant and irrelevant CITanswers. The PPI was
included to examine whether this hyporeactivity phenomenon in
high PPI individuals could be replicated and if addition of a SVT
could be a potential solution for the reduced detection efﬁciency
that it implies.
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants
Participants were 60 people (18 men) recruited through adver-
tisement in local newspapers. The mean age was 33 years
(SD5 9.1). All participants read and signed a letter of informed
consent before participating. The experiment was approved by
the Faculty’s ethical committee.
Measurements
TheDutch translation of the Psychopathic Personality Inventory
(PPI; Jelicic, Merckelbach, Timmermans, & Candel, 2004;
Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996) was used to assess psychopathic
traits. Following Benning, Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen, and
Krueger (2003) and Verschuere et al. (2005), we calculated the
Fearless Dominance factor and the Impulsive Antisocial factor
by summing scores across the appropriate subscales while com-
pensating for the fact that these subscales consist of different
numbers of items. Physiological measures were identical to those
in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Participants who responded to the newspaper advertisement
were contacted for an appointment. During this initial contact,
they were asked to supply autobiographical information (e.g.,
place of birth, mother’s maiden name, etc.) that was subsequent-
ly used as stimulus material in the experiment.
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were asked to ﬁll
out the PPI. Subsequently, they were given written instructions.
Combining CITand SVT 817
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of the Concealed Information Test (CIT), Symptom Validity Test (SVT), and Their
Combination for the Guilty and Innocent Conditionsa
Measure Mean z guilty Standard deviation guilty Mean z innocent Standard deviation innocent d a 95% CI of a
Experiment 1
CIT 0.78 0.61  0.06 0.41 1.62 .86 .77 –.96
SVT 0.73 1.41  0.15 0.71 0.79 .70 .56 –.83
SVT & CIT 1.51 1.47  0.21 0.88 1.42 .84 .74 –.95
Experiment 2
CIT 0.95 0.60 0.10 0.39 1.68 .88 .81–.94
SVT 2.08 1.34 0.02 0.76 1.89 .87 .81–.93
SVT & CIT 3.03 1.44 0.12 0.85 2.46 .95 .91–.99
aStandardized differences between the means of the guilty and innocent condition (d ). Area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (a), with its
95% conﬁdence interval.
These instructions explained that in some circumstances, claim-
ing memory problems can have beneﬁcial effects. An example of
how feigning memory problems after a trafﬁc accident could
increase compensation payments paid by the insurance company
was given. Next, participants were instructed to feign complete
memory loss of their identity and told that the experiment was
designed to test new methods to detect their deceit. They were
explicitly told to try to beat the test and were promised a h5
reward if they succeeded.
Initially, participants provided the experimenter with a pos-
sible total of 24 autobiographical details. On the basis of these
details, 18 questions were constructed, divided into three sets of 6
questions, such that the different sets all contained questions of a
similar nature (e.g., each set contained the same number of
names of relatives). Subsequently, one set was used for the CIT
and two for the SVT. The order of the two tests was counter-
balanced. The remainder of the procedure was identical to Ex-
periment 1, with the exception that the critical alternative was
randomly presented at any position except for the ﬁrst.
Response Scoring and Data Analysis
Response scoring and data analysiswere similar to Experiment 1.
Because only ‘‘guilty’’ participants were included, signal detec-
tion parameters were derived differently (see below).
Results and Discussion
SVTand CIT scores within guilty participants were uncorrelated
(r5  .04, p5 .77). Using identical criteria as in Experiment 1
resulted in correct classiﬁcation of 39 (65%) of the participants
for the CIT and 38 (63%) of the participants for the SVT. The
combination of the CITand SVTcorrectly classiﬁed 53 (88%) of
the guilty participants.
To derive signal detection indices, a number of previous stud-
ies that included only guilty participants compared the distribu-
tion of the standardized critical items to the distribution of the
average standardized control items (e.g., Elaad & Ben-Shakhar,
2006; Gronau, Ben-Shakhar, & Cohen, 2005; Verschuere et al.,
2005; see also Ben-Shakhar, 1985). As we will argue below,
however, this procedure is suboptimal and overestimates detec-
tion efﬁciency.
The standardization procedure described by Ben-Shakhar
(1985) entails subtracting the mean and dividing the outcome by
the standard deviation of responses to all alternatives from either
the response to the critical alternative or from the response to the
control alternatives. As a consequence, all information in the
data set is used to derive the distribution of the critical item.
Applying the same procedure to the control items can thus, by
deﬁnition, not result in a distribution of control items containing
unique information. In fact, each participant’s score for the con-
trol items, together forming the ‘‘innocent’’ group, is linearly
dependent on that participant’s score on the critical items. This is
because the score on the control items is simply the score on the
critical item, divided by  (N 1), where N denotes the total
number of unique stimuli. For the demonstration please refer to
Appendix A. Furthermore, as a consequence of the averaging
over the standardized control items, the standard deviation of the
distribution of control scores becomes approximately
p
(N 1)
times smaller than would have been the case if they had been
obtained from a single item (e.g., the item that was critical in the
‘‘guilty’’ group). Thus, in case of successful detection, this pro-
cedure renders a distribution of the control item with a negative
mean and a smaller standard deviation than a hypothetical group
of truly innocent participants. The latter would have a mean of
0 and an unbiased standard deviation. As a consequence of this
negative mean and smaller standard deviation, signal detection
parameters will be unjustly inﬂated.
Alternatively, we chose to base our signal detection param-
eters on a comparisonwith a simulated innocent group consisting
of 60 participants (see alsoCarmel et al., 2003). Such a groupwas
created for both tests by randomly drawing values from their
respective distributions, and treating these values in exactly the
same manner as the values measured for guilty participants. For
the SVT, this entailed drawing 60 values from the binomial dis-
tribution with N5 12 and p5 .5. For the CIT it entailed the
following steps. First, ﬁve values were randomly drawn from a
standard normal distribution (mean5 0, standard devia-
tion5 1). Then, one value (as the ‘‘response’’ to the critical
item) was standardized relative to the mean and standard devi-
ation of all ﬁve responses. This way, a standardized score for one
innocent person for one question was derived. This process was
repeated six times (to simulate six questions), and these six values
were averaged to represent a score for one innocent participant.
Based on this procedure, the d values were 1.68, 1.89, and 2.46
for the CIT, SVT, and their combination, respectively, and a
values were .88, .87, and .95. These values, with their corre-
sponding 95% conﬁdence interval are presented in Table 1 (bot-
tom panel). Statistical testing of these a values revealed that the
combination of the two tests outperformed the CIT alone
(z5 2.24, p5 .01; see Hanley & McNeil, 1983).
Fifty-seven participants ﬁlled out the PPI completely. Mean
total score was 341 (SD5 39; range5 256–420). Internal con-
sistency was high (Cronbach’s alpha5 .89). The Fearless Dom-
inance and Impulsive Antisocial subscales were uncorrelated,
r5 .17, p5 .21. To investigate the relationship between psycho-
pathic personality traits and overall physiological responding,
we computed the correlation between these PPI subscales and
the unstandardizedmean skin conductance response. Neither the
Fearless Dominance factor nor the Impulsive Antisocial factor
signiﬁcantly correlated with overall physiological responding
(r5  .08, p5 .57 and r5  .04, p5 .75, respectively). Simi-
larly, the correlations between the two subscales and the detec-
tion measures for CIT and SVT did not attain signiﬁcance
(r5  .24, p5 .07 and r5  .11, p5 .41 for CITand r5  .07,
p5 .62 and r5  .11, p5 .42 for SVT with the Fearless Dom-
inance and the Impulsive Antisocial subscales, respectively).
General Discussion
This study aimed to investigate whether SVT can be used to
detect deception and whether combining it with a CIT would
yield detection efﬁciency superior to that of the CITalone. First
of all, the results fromboth experiments show that the SVTcan be
used to detect deception. Furthermore, we found that combining
the two tests yielded superior detection efﬁciency, but only in the
feigned amnesia experiment.
In both experiments, the accuracy rate of the SVT in detecting
deception was similar to that found in studies on false claims of
amnesia (e.g., Jelicic et al., 2004a, 2004b; Merckelbach et al.,
2002). This is not surprising, because the instructions to the par-
ticipants in all these studies were highly similar. That is, the in-
struction to feign amnesia for a mock crime is a special instance
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of instructing participants to lie (Christianson & Merckelbach,
2004).
The accuracy rates obtained with the CITwere equivalent to
those found in earlier studies as well (e.g., Carmel et al., 2003).
Importantly, the instructions to the guilty participants in
our Experiment 1 contained no speciﬁc information addressed
by the subsequent CIT items (e.g., the instructions read ‘‘steal
the money . . . ’’ and not ‘‘steal the 20 euro . . . ’’). Therefore,
our Experiment 1 would qualify as a procedure that Carmel
and coworkers (2003) termed a ‘‘valid mock crime,’’ and
it yielded detection rates similar to those obtained by these
authors.
The ability of both the SVTand CIT to differentiate between
guilty and innocent participants is also evident from the d values.
In terms of Cohen (1988), the value of 0.79 for the SVT in Ex-
periment 1 represents a moderate to large effect size, whereas the
1.62 for the CIT in Experiment 1 and 1.68 and 1.89 found in
Experiment 2 all represent a large effect size.
The detection efﬁciency found in Experiment 2 was higher
than that in Experiment 1, particularly for the SVT. This may
explainwhy the incremental validity was limited toExperiment 2.
The predictive validity of the SVT in Experiment 1 may simply
have been too low to establish a signiﬁcant incremental validity
given the number of participants.
There are three factors that may have contributed to the
difference in detection efﬁciency between the two experiments. To
begin with, it might be that because of its personal relevance, the
autobiographical paradigm yields higher accuracy than themock
crime paradigm. At ﬁrst sight, this might seem difﬁcult to rec-
oncile with the ﬁndings of Ben-Shakhar and Elaad (2003), who
found that mock crime studies yield higher accuracy than studies
using the personal item paradigm. It should be noted, however,
that our personal item paradigm was adapted such that partic-
ipants were speciﬁcally instructed to feign amnesia whereas in
many other studies, participants are merely instructed to deny
recognition. This way our personal item paradigm more closely
resembles a mock crime than a typical personal item paradigm.
Furthermore, in their study on the validity of reaction times in
the detection of concealed information, Gronau et al. (2005)
found a similar pattern. In that study, reaction times differed
between relevant and irrelevant items when they denoted per-
sonally signiﬁcant information, but not when they pertained to
mock crime details. Second, participants in Experiment 2 were
promised a ﬁnancial incentive for beating the test. This may have
increased accuracy through an increase in motivation and is
probably ecologically valid, because in typical applied settings,
great interests are at stake. Finally, the fact that participants in
Experiment 2 were drawn from a community sample may have
boosted detection rates. After all, people from a community
sample are less likely to understand the rationale of the SVTand
they have less knowledge of the phenomenon of random perfor-
mance. However, both Jelicic et al. (2004a) and Merckelbach
et al. (2002) also found sensitivities on the order of 60% in an
undergraduate sample.
The continuous scores on the CITand SVTwithin the guilty
group were independent (r5  .11 in Experiment 1 and
r5  .04 in Experiment 2). Also the dichotomized scores (‘‘in-
nocent’’ vs. ‘‘guilty’’) showed independence: It appeared that the
actual probability of being declared guilty on either test (.57 in
Experiment 1, .88 in Experiment 2) was very close to the expected
probability given independence of the probability of a guilty SVT
outcome and the probability of a guilty CIT outcome (.61 in
Experiment 1, .87 in Experiment 2).2 One implication of this
independence is that, to the extent that false negative outcomes of
the CIT are caused by too small responses in the underlying
psychophysiological mechanisms, adding SVT might be a solu-
tion. A second practical implication is that, because the two tests
measure differentmechanisms, theymay not be susceptible to the
same countermeasures. Countermeasures refer to anything that
an individual might do in an effort to defeat or distort a poly-
graph test (Honts, Devitt, Winbush, & Kircher, 1996). To the
extent that various physiological indices aremanifestations of the
same underlying mechanism (i.e., orienting response), any coun-
termeasure aimed at interfering with this mechanism (e.g.,
counting backwards from 200 by 7) is likely to have similar
undermining effects on these indices. In contrast, adding inde-
pendent tests may limit the effects of such countermeasures, al-
though this is an issue that warrants systematic empirical testing.
The psychopathy scores obtained in Experiment 2 did not
show any link to overall psychophysiological reactivity or with
the detection measure of the CIT. This failure to replicate the
ﬁndings of Verschuere et al. (2005) may have various reasons.
For one thing, Verschuere et al. had a prison sample, whereas the
current study relied on a community sample. Although one
would expect more extreme psychopathy scores in a prison sam-
ple, inspection of the data does not conﬁrm this. The mean total
score of the community sample in Experiment 2 (M5 341,
SD5 39) was not dramatically lower than that reported by Ve-
rschuere and coworkers for their prison sample (M5 350,
SD5 40). Another possible explanation might be that in our
second experiment, contrary to the study by Verschuere et al.
(2005), a monetary incentive was promised. It could be argued
that psychopaths do not show underarousal under motivational
conditions (Arnett, 1997; Verschuere, Crombez, Koster, & De
Clercq, 2007). Furthermore, our failure to ﬁnd an association
between psychopathy scores and psychophysiological reactivity
is in linewith earlier work ofGudjonsson (1982) and Balloun and
Holmes (1979), who also found no effect of personality on the
detection of concealed information. The exact relation between
the PPI and autonomous reactivity remains unclear and merits
further research.
Another important point of consideration is the practical ap-
plicability of the SVT. When combining this procedure with a
CIT, little extra effort is needed. Assuming that in the process of
preparing CITquestions, the crime scene has been visited or the
criminal records and ﬁles have been inspected, little extra effort is
needed to create additional SVT items. Some authors (e.g., Pod-
lesney, 1993, 2003) have argued that in real-life cases, it is often
difﬁcult to formulate sufﬁcient questions with equally plausible
answer items. On the other hand, SVT items can be constructed
using only two plausible answer alternatives. They allow, for
example, yes/no answer options. This makes it relatively easy to
develop sufﬁcient items.
When using these tests as forensic tools, one needs to keep in
mind that with the cutoff points chosen, and even with SVTand
CITcombined, speciﬁcity is higher than sensitivity. This implies
that both measures can best be used as challenge tasks in the
forensic domain. Thus, failing to pass the SVT or the CIT is a
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2If the probabilities of being declared guilty on each test are inde-
pendent of each other, under the parallel testing rule, the expected prob-
ability of being declared guilty on either or both is given by:
seA1(1 seA)  seB, where seA represents the sensitivity of test A
and seB represents the sensitivity of test B.
strong indication of guilt, but passing both tests is not a strong
indication of innocence (see also Denney, 1996).
In the analysis of the data from Experiment 2 we encountered
a problem with the method that is often used to derive signal
detection parameters. As a solution, we proposed a simulated
‘‘innocent’’ group. Comparing the two methods by cross check-
ing our own data from Experiment 1 supported our conclusion
that an analysis based on the guilty participants’ standardized
critical items and the guilty participants’ standardized control
items leads to an overestimation of the signal detection param-
eters. This method yielded an a of .95 and a d of 2.21, whereas the
empirical a and dwere .86 and 1.62, respectively. Comparison of
the standardized critical item of the guilty participants to a sim-
ulated group of innocent participants yielded an a of .85 and a d
of 1.55, indicating that our simulation procedure yields better
estimates of the fully empirical signal detection parameters. It is
also noteworthy that the mean and standard deviation of the
empirical group of innocents in Experiment 1 and the simulated
group of innocents in Experiment 2 were highly similar. The
overestimation of signal detection parameters that results from
Ben-Shakhar’s (1985) method might also explain the high values
found in the study by Gronau et al. (2005), and might also ex-
plain the ﬁnding by Elaad and Ben-Shakhar (2006) of better
detection efﬁciency in their experiment with only guilty partic-
ipants than in their experiment including guilty and innocent
participants. We recommend that future research using Ben
Shakhar’s (1985) standardization procedure should either incor-
porate both guilty and innocent subjects or compare the distri-
bution of the guilty participants to that of a simulated group of
innocent participants.
Finally, we can make two recommendations for future re-
search. First, data from Experiment 2 showed that addition of a
behavioral measure increased detection efﬁciency. Addition of a
respiration measure, however, has also been shown to increase
detection efﬁciency (Ben-Shakhar & Dolev, 1996; Elaad et al.,
1992; but see Verschuere et al., 2007). Future studies could make
a direct comparison between the incremental validity of a psy-
chophysiological measure like respiration with that of behavioral
measures like the SVT. Secondly, recent studies have shown that
peripheral details do not serve as good CIT items (Carmel et al.,
2003; Jokinen, Santtila, Ravaja, & Puttonen, 2006). Of special
interest in this matter is a study by Lieblich, Ben Shakhar, and
Kugelmass (1976), who showed that detection of relevant auto-
biographical information like names of relatives was better than
detection of less relevant information like favorite brand of cig-
arettes. To the extent that the detection efﬁciency of the CIT is
determined by salience of the test items, reserving themost salient
items for the CITwhile including the less salient items in the SVT
may boost detection efﬁciency even more then found in Exper-
iment 2.
Altogether, our results suggest that it is worthwhile to com-
bine several different types of lie detection and that testing for
concealed information need not be conﬁned to indices measuring
orienting response.
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APPENDIX A
The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate the linear dependency of the standardized response to a critical item (probe) and the
standardized response to control items (irrelevants), when both are derived from the same data set.
For each participant and question, wemeasured the responses
to N5 5 unique stimuli, that is 1 probe (p), and N 1 irrelevants ði1; . . . ; iN1Þ. Following Ben-Shakhar (1985), these responses were
transformed to z-scores for the irrelevants:
zj ¼ ðij  XÞ=sdx; j ¼ 1; . . . ; N  1; ð1Þ
and for the probe:
zp ¼ ðp XÞ=sdx; ð2Þ
where X and sdx denote the average and standard deviation across all N stimuli, respectively.
In order to derive anROC curve and compute the area under this curve (a) and d, Ben-Shakhar used the reponses of ‘‘guilty’’ subjects
to the irrelevant answer-stimuli to generate an ‘‘innocent’’ group (representing a group for whom all answer-stimuli would be
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irrelevant). For this, the average of the irrelevant z-scores was used:
Zi ¼
X
ðz1; . . . ; zN1Þ=ðN  1Þ: ð3Þ
By deﬁnition, the average of all z-scores is 0:
X
ðz1; . . . ; zN1; zPÞ=N ¼ 0: ð4Þ
This means that
X
ðz1; . . . ; zN1; zPÞ ¼ 0; ð5Þ
and also that
X
ðz1; . . . ; zN1Þ þ zP ¼ 0: ð6Þ
Rewriting (3) as
X
ðz1; . . . ; zN1Þ ¼ Zi  ðN  1Þ ð7Þ
and ﬁlling in in (6) gives
Zi  ðN  1Þ þ zP ¼ 0; ð8Þ
Zi ¼ zP= ðN  1Þ; ð9Þ
demonstrating the linear dependency of Zi and zp within one question. This linear dependency remains when the standardized
responses are averaged across multiple questions.
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